regionales. El Estatuto es considerado dañino porque confiere poderes limitados sobre el ACTHR; principalmente, su competencia es restringida a casos entre sólo estados, los individuos no tienen ningunos derechos de acceso. Tomando la omisión de ciertas funciones judiciales en la consideración la conclusión es que el ACTHR concebido según el Estatuto improbablemente se demuestra como un guarda poderoso de derechos humanos en una región preocupada.
On September 7th 2014, the Member States of the League of Arab States, or Arab League (LAS), 1 (Statute) , making provision for the establishment of a new regional human rights mechanism.
approved the Statute of the Arab Court of Human Rights
2 With the Arab human rights system in its infancy, the Statute addresses a significant lacuna in the indigenous protection of human rights and in theory could constitute an important step in securing such rights. However, it is true that its worth can only be measured if the Arab Court of Human Rights (ACtHR) is capable of making, or makes, a significant and real contribution to securing the rights of the citizens of the LAS Member States.
The parent body, the LAS, is a regional, intergovernmental organization founded in 1945, with its headquarters in Cairo (Egypt), membership of which is open to independent Arab states. 3 The LAS Charter is the organization's constituent instrument, defining its structure and functions. To the modern eye the LAS Charter appears rather simplistic in form; its paramount objectives are centered on the strengthening of inter-state relations, upholding the sovereignty and independence of its Member States and enhancing co-operation in economic and financial affairs, and the communications, social, health and cultural fields. 4 The realization of selfdetermination also appears to have been a motivating force. 5 Nowhere in the LAS Charter is any explicit reference made to human rights. It may be unrealistic to have expected much in this regard at the time, given that Arab governments have traditionally maintained a marked reluctance to pay heed to these values but rather adhere to sovereignty-based conceptions of international law. 6 In fact, many of its Member States do not adhere to the values of liberal representative and pluralist democracy to this day. 7 However, the LAS subsequently adopted a human rights [Statute] .For English and French translations, online: <www.acihl.org>. policy as one of the areas of co-operation among the membership 8 which led in 1968 to the establishment of the Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights (Permanent Commission), a largely consultative body, rather than a monitoring one. 9 It was only in the 1990s that the LAS earnestly began to pursue a human rights-based path, culminating in the signing of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (1994 Charter) . 10 The 1994 Charter never entered into force and was replaced ten years later by a revised Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004 Charter) , which became operative in 2008.
11
A notable feature of the 2004 Charter is the lack of a judicial supervisory organ taking the form of a regional human rights court. Instead, it makes provision for an Arab Human Rights Committee mandated to examine and comment upon state reports detailing the domestic measures taken to implement the rights and freedoms recognized in the 2004 Charter.
During 2012, the project for an Arab human rights court became a priority for the LAS, largely as the result of two developments. First, increased calls for better protection of fundamental freedoms and democratic norms advanced during the popular uprisings in the Arab world, collectively known as the "Arab Spring".
12
Secondly, proposals for modernizing the LAS so that it was better equipped to address contemporary challenges. Moving relatively swiftly, a draft statute for an Arab court of human rights was prepared and approved in 2014. Despite attracting considerable criticism, 13 the existence of a judicial body, however imperfect, seems, at least in theory, preferable than none at all. At the same time, it should be noted that Arab states do not have much experience of regional courts: since the 1950s, the LAS has attempted unsuccessfully to establish an Arab court of justice as its judicial organ. 14 serious human rights concerns were expressed about the following LAS Member States: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. 8 Hassan, supra note 6 at 241-43; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "La Ligue des Etats arabes" in Karel Vasak, ed, Les dimensions internationales des droits de l'homme (Paris: UNESCO, 1978 The focus of this article is a critical assessment of the ACtHR, its structure, composition and competences, and the salient features and flaws of its Statute, deliberated in Section III. This article highlights the fact that a number of important jurisdictional and procedural issues are absent from the Statute. Arguably the most significant of these is the fact that no provision is made for a right of individual petition, the jurisdiction of the ACtHR being limited to interstate cases, an extraordinary state of affairs for a human rights court. The extent to which the ACtHR can act as an effective guarantor of human rights is a key consideration. Where pertinent, comparisons with other regional human rights treaties and courts will be made, thereby drawing attention to the Statute's limitations. The fact that the ACtHR has the capacity to apply and interpret the 2004 Charter justifies a brief consideration of the 2004 Charter which is provided in Section I. However, the specific rights included in the 2004 Charter are similar to those contained in comparable documents, especially the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter); 15 these have been subjected to repeated and detailed analysis elsewhere and hence there is no need to rehearse those arguments here which in any case are beyond the scope of this article. As the sole supervisory body prior to the creation of the ACtHR, the Arab Human Rights Committee is examined in Section II. Its role is also a limited one. This article therefore reaches the conclusion that the Arab human rights system is feeble and ineffectual.
I.

The Arab Charter on Human Rights -A Brief Overview
Given that the ACtHR's formal role is to apply and interpret the 2004 Charter, it seems appropriate to give a brief account of the salient features of this instrument. The initial attempt by the LAS at a human rights treaty, the 1994 Charter, never attracted the support necessary to enter into force. It was considered fundamentally flawed as it contained provisions incompatible with basic standards of international human rights law, lacking safeguards or effective measures of implementation. 16 In particular, it contained a general limitation clause effectively allowing for the negation of the enjoyment of the Charter's rights and freedoms.
17
The 1994 Charter was accordingly described as "a dead letter" and "meaningless".
18
The 1994 Charter was replaced by a revised treaty which was adopted by the 16th Ordinary LAS Summit at The 2004 Charter joins the ranks of those regional instruments that contain in a single binding legal document all three categories of human rights, civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights and third generation or peoples' rights. 22 It thus reflects in part the position adopted by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 23 and the Vienna Declaration which call for parity between the different generations of rights. 24 But neither should it be overlooked that the 2004 Charter is also inspired by the Islamic philosophy of rights which is 'theocentric' and places greater emphasis on the nexus between the individual and the wider community. Thus, it focuses more on the collective, rather than the perceived unbridled individualism-cum-licence of the Western classical theory of human rights. 25 While the 2004 Charter situates international human rights within the established cultural, societal and religious context, responsive to Arab needs and values, it is encouraging to observe that it asserts in the Preamble the principles of, inter alia, the UDHR and other international human rights treaties and proclaims as an essential element of human rights "the principle that human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated" (article 1(4)). 26 The 2004 Charter allows for derogation in "exceptional cases of emergency" and must be strictly required by the necessity of the circumstances. 31 Measures of derogation must be consistent with the other obligations of States Parties under international law and must also be non-discriminatory. 32 Derogation from certain rights is prohibited and judicial guarantees for their protection cannot be suspended. 33 This provision, which seems to be more stringent than global standards, 34 is a considerable improvement upon the corresponding provision in the 1994 Charter which demonstrably failed to do so. 35 Problematic is the fact that the 2004 Charter contains many instances where the rights and freedoms are expressed in general and opaque terms and the substantive content is unenumerated. Too many rights and freedoms are subject to limitations and the dictates of national law. 36 The denunciation of Zionism, initially expressed in the 1994 Charter, may seem unfortunate and outdated but can be explained as a political imperative while the Palestinian question remains unresolved. 37 In fact, for many years Arab states have used the human rights discourse not so much to advance the cause of fundamental freedoms in the region but to condemn Israel for its treatment of the Palestinians. 38 Nevertheless, the 2004 Charter is to be commended for taking account of the evolution of international human rights law so that protection is extended to vulnerable groups such as migrant workers, minorities and persons with disabilities.
39
There is no mention as such of the aged 40 or indigenous peoples, but bringing the latter within its scope is not an insurmountable problem. 41 The 2004 Vienna Declaration, supra note 24 at art 4(1).
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid at art 4(2).
34
Zerrougui, supra note 19 at 13.
35
Hassan, supra note 6 at 246. 43 This obligation does not amount to a requirement to incorporate the treaty as such into national law but it should nevertheless result in its practical implementation. 44 Nevertheless, in order to meet their international obligations and better secure human rights, it would be preferable if the Charter in toto was incorporated into national law.
Viewed overall, the 2004 Charter may be regarded as an adequate human rights treaty notwithstanding the fact that some of its provisions fall short of current norms of international law and human rights. 45 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the time, Louise Arbour, was particularly critical. 46 Safeguards or effective measures of implementation are still insubstantial. These are concerns which the ACtHR, if and when it becomes operative, will no doubt have to address. The ACtHR's approach to the interpretation and application of the Charter's rights and freedoms is awaited with interest; will it exercise restraint and show deference towards national decision-making, or will it seek to enhance the protection of human rights? Just how effective a guarantor of human rights will it turn out to be? These are speculative questions that can only be answered once the ACtHR commences its work. But the African experience suggests that pessimism may be misplaced and that weak institutions on paper may develop into robust guardians. Notwithstanding the early jaundiced view of many that the African Charter was fatally flawed and human rights inadequately protected by a feeble Commission 47 over the years, the African Commission has evolved into a solid and effective guarantor of human rights.
48
II. The Arab Human Rights Committee
A significant omission from the 2004 Charter is that of a complaint mechanism for states and individuals. It provides for an Arab Human Rights Committee (Committee), but as will be seen, its role is extremely limited. The 2004 Charter does not address the Committee's mandate in great detail but concerns itself mainly with procedural matters regarding the appointment of its members (articles 45 to 48). The reason is that, according to article 45(7) of the 2004 Charter, 49 the Committee is empowered to establish its own Rules of Procedure (Rules) finally adopted in 2014. 50 The Committee, which became operative in March 2009, is seated in Cairo (Egypt) and is composed of seven members, nationals of State Parties, elected by secret ballot by contracting Parties. 51 Committee members are elected for a fouryear term and may be re-elected for one further term.
52 They must be highly experienced and show competence in its field of work, 53 but it does not seem that prior legal experience is a requirement. Committee members serve in their personal capacity and must be independent and impartial. 54 Article 48 of the 2004 Charter 55 lays down the Committee's terms of reference and its role is very limited and does not even make provision for a quasijudicial function. The Committee's role is not that of a guardian or protector of human rights, but supervisory. Unlike other regional human rights supervisory organs which have a dual mandate, scrutinising, on the one hand, periodic state reports on the measures taken to implement the rights and freedoms envisaged in a relevant treaty and, on the other hand, considering individual petitions or interstate complaints on alleged violations, 56 guidance as to their obligations. 58 The Committee's powers in this context could be important given that it has assumed a quasi-judicial function, similar to the advisory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, in defining and declaring the extent of fundamental freedoms and duties.
Pursuant to article 48(6) of the 2004 Charter, 59 the Committee's reports, observations and recommendations are public documents and it is under a duty to disseminate them widely. The Committee examines the reports, comments upon them and makes "the necessary recommendations in accordance with the aims of the 2004 Charter". 60 The Committee submits annual reports on its activities to the Council, the premier organ of the LAS, with its comments and recommendations. This provides it with the opportunity to hold States Parties accountable. This is the most that the Committee can do under its present powers.
The fact that the Committee's work is published in Arabic only limits its accessibility to a wider audience, a fact that has been criticized. 61 Nevertheless, the Committee carries out its principal mandate, namely, to review periodic reports relating to the domestic implementation of the 2004 Charter. Although not envisaged in the latter, the Committee also accepts reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other interested civil society organisations (CSOs) with the proviso that these bodies are located in the contacting party whose report is under examination and that the reports do not focus on individual cases. 62 While such supervision has its uses and can be effective if states accept the Committee's recommendations in good faith, it does little to secure effective legal protection in individual cases.
Although the Committee has taken the opportunity offered by the drafting of its Rules 63 to expand its mandate by assuming an interpretative role, this has been but a modest step. At present, the Committee has no right to petition the ACtHR, nor can it consider individual complaints, significant weaknesses. It is disappointing to note that there is no mention whatsoever of the Committee in the Statute of the ACtHR; the two bodies appear to exist in a vacuum with no formal relationship. They will operate in parallel, in their different spheres, but never interact. By way of contrast, the African Commission has interpreted its mandate creatively, including through its Ibid at art 48(3), (4).The Committee can request states to furnish it with more information, ibid at art 48(2). Rules of Procedure, to expand its powers in significant ways. 64 It can thus appoint thematic rapporteurs and working groups and send 'protection missions' to conduct on site investigations. 65 The Committee could do worse than follow its example; the adoption of its Rules in 2014, 66 so unexceptional, must be considered a missed opportunity, but perhaps this reflected the limit of the achievable. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the twenty-first century, its limited mandate is a matter of considerable regret.
III. The Arab Court of Human Rights
The 2004 judicial organ affiliated to the LAS, and certainly not as its main judicial body. This is manifested in article 2 of the Statute, 71 which stipulates that, within the LAS framework, the ACtHR is established as an independent Arab judicial body seeking to consolidate the contracting parties' will to implement their obligations pertaining to human rights and fundamental freedoms, a commitment which arguably extends further than the 2004 Charter, as is evident from the reference in article 16 of the Statute 72 to other Arab human rights treaties. The ACtHR's nature as an autonomous treaty body is confirmed in the Statute by article 16 setting out its jurisdiction and by article 4 creating a discrete body which exercises certain administrative powers, 73 the Assembly of States Parties as opposed to the LAS.
It should be observed from the outset that a number of important substantive and procedural matters regarding the work of the ACtHR have been omitted from the Statute. It may be that such details will be provided by the Rules of Procedure (ACtHR Rules) but a cynical interpretation may suggest that the LAS Member States are simply keen to exercise tight control over the activities of the ACtHR. The scepticism is reinforced by the fact, although the ACtHR drafts its Rules, it is the Assembly of States Parties that adopts them.
74 This is contrary to established international practice. 76 Under the European system, both the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly have roles to play in the election of judges, the carrying out of judgments and the setting of the budget. 77 Under the InterAmerican system, the OAS General Assembly has similar functions. 78 Article 4 of the ACtHR Statute does not explicitly state all the competencies with which the Assembly will be endowed but leaves this matter to be determined in its bylaws, or rules, which will be adopted once the Statute has entered into force. The only competencies laid down in the third paragraph of article 4 of the Statute 79 are the election of judges; the acceptance of the ACtHR's annual report; the drawing up of its 71 Statute, supra note 2 at art 2. 72 Statute, supra note 2 at art 16. However, the Statute affords to the Assembly other duties as well, which, as will later be argued, appropriates from the ACtHR important functions which are traditionally exercised by international courts. One of these, in relation to the Rules, has been mentioned above. It cannot be discounted that the Assembly is intended to keep a close watch on the ACtHR.
B. Composition of the Court
The ACtHR, seated in Manama (Bahrain), 82 is composed of seven judges, though this may be increased to eleven at the request of the ACtHR and if approved by the Assembly. 83 The ACtHR convenes in chambers of at least three judges to hear the subject matter of disputes. 84 Oddly, the Statute makes no mention of how many judges are required for the ACtHR or chambers to be quorate but it may be one of the issues to be determined by the Rules. 85 The Statute is also silent as to the ACtHR's official and working languages, which presumably will be Arabic. 86 Also absent from the Statute is any requirement that the different regions and its principal juridical traditions be represented on the ACtHR. 87 The judges must be nationals of State Parties, as opposed to nationals of LAS Member States which may not necessarily have ratified the Statute, and no more than one judge may be of the same nationality.
88 Each member state may nominate two of its nationals as candidate.
89
Candidates must possess competence and experience in legal or judicial office and
80
Presumably the reference here is not only to the Assembly's own budget but also to the ACtHR's budget because, under article 31 of the Statute, the former is approved by the Assembly and funded through contracting parties' contributions. Note that the IACHR drafts its own budget subject to the approval of the OAS General Assembly, ACHR, supra note 41 at art 72.
81
See further ACHR, supra note 41 at art 30 stipulating that the Bylaws will also specify the salaries of judges and of the other staff as well as the requirements to secure their independence and availability. 82 Statute, supra note 2 at art 3. In exceptional cases, the ACtHR may meet in another country with its approval. The choice of Bahrain, a country with a poor human rights record, as the seat of the ACtHR has attracted criticism, see International Commission of Jurists, supra note 13 at 6. 83 Statute, supra note 2at art 5.
84
Ibid at art 24(2). 85 must have the qualifications for appointment to the highest legal or judicial offices in their states, and experience in human rights is preferred. 90 The reference to legal office may suggest persons who have held positions such as that of attorney-general. The preference for human rights expertise is sensible although this has been criticized by the International Commission of Jurists as inadequate. 91 As was mentioned, the judges are elected by the Assembly by secret ballot 92 and in an unusual move, it maintains a reserve list of judges from the candidates that were not elected. 93 Judges serve a term of office of four years with the possibility of one further renewable period. 94 The Statute is silent as to whether the judges are hired on a fulltime or part-time basis, only in relation to the president does the Statute stipulate that the position is full-time, 95 although they must be at the service of the ACtHR at any time. 96 Vacancies may result from death, resignation, permanent disability or dismissal. 97 In such circumstances, another judge shall be elected to complete the predecessor's term of office unless the vacancy occurs six months prior to the expiration of the judge's term of office, in which case the president may appoint a judge from the reserve list.
Cf Rules of Court of the European Court of Human
98 A judge's removal from office is in the hands of the other judges who must decide that he or she no longer meets the requirements and demands of the office or meets the standards for which he or she was appointed.
99
Although the Statute does not explicitly state that the judges serve in an individual capacity and not as representatives of their states, 100 this condition follows from the judges' duty to perform their tasks with independence and impartiality. 101 However, in order to reinforce the commitment to judicial independence a provision should have been added to the effect that State Parties shall not seek to influence, 90 Statute, supra note 2 at art 7.
91
The International Commission of Jurists, supra note 13 at 13-14, argues that the judges should be required to have human rights expertise as is the case with the judges on the IACHR and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights [ACtHPR], see Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (2011) at art 4(1), online: <www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/statutecourt.asp> [IACHR Statute] , and Protocol on the African Court, supra note 75 at art 11(1). Interestingly, the ECHR is silent on the matter, see ECHR, supra note 75 at art 21(1). 92 Statute,supra note 2 at art 6(1). Nevertheless, the International Commission of Jurists is of the view that the nomination and election process is not sufficiently transparent, supra note 13 at 15-16. Statute, supra note 2 at art 8(1). Interestingly, this term of office is the shortest, the judges on the other regional courts serving a term of six years, see ECHR, supra note 75 at art 23(1); ACHR, supra note 41 at art 54(1); Protocol on the African Court, supra note 75 at art 15(3). 95 Statute, supra note 2at art 11(3).
96
Protocol on the African Court, supra note 75 at art 15(1).
97
Ibid at art 9(1).
98
99
Ibid at art 15(5).Under the ACHR it is the OAS General Assembly that exercises the power of sanctions against judges but only at the judges' request, ACHR, supra note 41 at art 73. 100 Cf ECHR, supra note 75 at art 21(2); IACHR Statute, supra note 91 at art 4(1); Protocol on the African Court, supra note 75 at art 33. 101 Statute, supra note 2 at art 15(1).
induce, pressure or threaten the judges in the discharge of their functions.
102
A judge who has had previous involvement with a case in any manner whatsoever may not hear that case. 103 In addition, a judge must declare any possible conflict of interest with any case he or she is hearing. 104 A judge who is a national of a state that is a party to a case must recuse himself or herself. 105 International practice is at variance and the only compelling reason to justify it is to avoid any semblance of partiality, but it is probably irreconcilable with the assertion of the judges' independence.
106
As has been seen, the Statute's provisions on the selection of judges have its shortcomings but these problems are not, in theory, insurmountable. They may be addressed by the Rules, as has happened in other jurisdictions. A policy of openness and transparency would help bolster faith in the integrity of the ACtHR.
C. The Question of Locus Standi
A crucial consideration that is at the crux of whether any human rights mechanism can amount to an effective guarantor of human rights revolves around the standing made available to individuals. Regrettably, the Statute fails this test miserably. Article 19 of the Statute 107 envisages a restrictive right of access to the ACtHR in that individuals are completely excluded from approaching it, the right being confined to contracting parties whose citizens, or 'subjects', 108 claim to be victims of human rights violations by another state. Thus, the cases before the ACtHR will be in effect interstate disputes, as no right of individual petition is recognized. In essence, the ACtHR will be nothing more than a toned down version of the International Court of Justice.
109 Universal and regional human rights systems make provision for interstate cases, but their experience is that only rarely does a party institute proceedings against another party; this because political considerations 102 Cf Protocol on the African Court, supra note 75 at art 17(1). See International Commission of Jurists, supra note 13 at 16. 103 Statute, supra note 2 at art 15(4). 104 Ibid at art 24(3). 105 Statute, supra note 2at art 24(4). 106 The Protocol on the African Court also assumes this position, while the ACHR is permissive. See
Protocol on the African Court, supra note 75 at art 22 and ACHR, supra note 41 at art 55(1). The ECHR takes a middle point. According to ECtHR Rule, judges are prevented from presiding in cases involving a contracting party of which they are nationals. See ECtHR Rule, supra note 85at rule13. 107 Statute, supra note 2 at art 19. prevail and states shy away from accusing other states of violating human rights.
110
Usually only in the context of grave or massive violations can states be prevailed upon to pursue legal action against another state. 111 But under the Statute, a state is limited to exercising its right of diplomatic protection, 112 it is not the case that the contracting parties are deemed to have a collective interest in upholding the provisions of the 2004 Charter. 113 The question of third-party intervention to uphold the common good does not arise. 114 Consequently, if State A is persecuting its own nationals, a religious or ethnic minority group for sake of argument, no matter how egregiously, State B would be unable to complain to the ACtHR. Furthermore, only a 'victim' can be the subject of a complaint. The possibility of a community interest, a kind of actio popularis or challenge in abstracto does not come up. The only positive feature in this sorry landscape is the fact that article 19(2) of the Statute 115 envisages a right of access for NGOs: contracting parties may, at any time, recognize that NGOs, which are accredited and working in the field of human rights in the contracting party whose subjects allege human rights violations, will have locus standi. The African experience demonstrates the invaluable role that NGOs can play in this regard and its worth should not be underrated. 116 Of course, this then begs the question whether states will be willing to accept this discretionary option and, if so, as to the degree to which NGOs will be free from harassment, hindrance and obstruction to perform this task.
If the LAS and its Member States were reluctant to grant individuals automatic or direct access to the ACtHR, it should have been possible to follow the example of the ACHR, Africa and the ECHR, and have the Committee act as a filter mechanism, endowing it with the sole right to process and refer individual complaints to the ACtHR. 117 This procedure could have been made contingent on a state's prior acceptance of the ACtHR's jurisdiction in accordance with a separate declaration.
118
Furthermore, following international practice, conditions of admissibility could have been put in place to ensure that cases without merit could have been dismissed at an early stage of the proceedings without having to encumber the ACtHR. 119 For the sake of credibility, at the very least the Committee should have been allowed to initiate proceedings before the ACtHR proprio motu.
120
D. The Competence of the Court
According to article 16 of the Statute, 121 the ACtHR has jurisdiction over all cases and litigation arising from the application and interpretation of the 2004 Charter as well as from any other Arab treaty in the field of human rights to which the disputing state is a contracting party. 122 The implementation of the protected rights and freedoms is a matter for the national authorities and not for the ACtHR and this fact is acknowledged by article 18 of the Statute 123 which proclaims, inter alia, that the ACtHR's jurisdiction is complementary to that of the national courts and does not supplant it. 124 Moreover, article 16(2) of the Statute 125 explicitly acknowledges the socalled principle of 'Kompetenz-Kompetenz', namely, that the ACtHR possesses the inherent power to decide itself any challenges to its jurisdiction. 126 Article 24(1) of the Statute 127 provides that challenges to the ACtHR's jurisdiction will be examined by a single judge. It seems inappropriate that a single judge should have the responsibility of determining the important questions that may be at stake in preliminary objections. It is perhaps unfortunate that the Statute itself has nothing further to say on the subject of preliminary objections although the Rules may address it. This has been the case in other jurisdictions.
In relation to the "Arab Treaties", the 2004 Charter does not explain which these might be. A broad reading could extend to any relevant human rights instrument that a State Party has ratified but a safer interpretation is that the reference is to treaties adopted by the LAS; if so, the only such treaty in question is the 2004 Charter. However, it is submitted that it can extend to include multilateral instruments adopted under the auspices of the LAS. These include the Arab Convention against Corruption, 129 and the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. 130 The Statute is silent as to the applicable law to which the ACtHR must have regard in determining the cases before it. An ordinary reading of article 16 does not suggest that the ACtHR is limited to taking account of the 2004 Charter and the Arab treaties to the exclusion of other international law. It is an accepted practice in international law for a court to rely on norms of international law in order to interpret and apply particular provisions of the treaty under consideration. The phrase 'application and "interpretation" could allow the ACtHR, if willing, to draw upon other sources of law, including international human rights law, in order to perform its role properly. 131 Thus, whereas the ECtHR is similarly limited in subject matter jurisdiction to the ECHR, it has frequently had to take into account other international law. 132 By way of contrast, the ACtHPR has expressly been granted a broad jurisdiction. 133 It is not conceivable that the ACtHR could be expected to play a credible and effective role unless it could invoke the relevant norms of general international and human rights law, and of universal and regional human rights treaties. It is important to bear in mind that many of the LAS Member States are parties to United Nations (UN) treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 134 (ICCPR) and regional instruments such as the African Charter. In view of the Statute's silence on the matter and given a court's inherent jurisdiction, it is possible to assert with confidence that the ACtHR should be able to resort to this rich body of law.
Article 20 of the Statute contains the so-called "promissory clause", whereby LAS Member States, which are not contracting parties to the Statute, may declare their acceptance of the ACtHR's jurisdiction either for specific cases or in general. Such declarations of acceptance of jurisdiction may be based on reciprocity or be unconditional or be time limited. 135 Article 17 of the Statute 136 limits the jurisdictional reach of the ACtHR by adopting the condition ratione temporis so that the ACtHR may only take account of facts that occurred after the Statute entered into force for the state in question. However, the concept of "continuing violations", that is, that jurisdiction will not be declined even though the violation had taken place before the state had become a party to the Statute because its effects continued to impact after that time, is embedded in international human rights law, and should therefore guide the ACtHR. 137 Article 18 of the Statute 138 enumerates three admissibility requirements, which appear to be exhaustive, which must be satisfied for the ACtHR to be able to proceed with a case. The first condition is the exhaustion of local remedies in the respondent state, as evidenced by a final and definitive judgment given according to the domestic legal system. This proviso is a generally recognised rule of international law 139 and exists in all major human rights instruments. 140 The wording of this provision suggests that the remedy should be a judicial one. Furthermore, international human rights law has established that remedies must be genuine and do not need to be exhausted if they are non-existent, ineffective or unreasonably prolonged. 141 The second condition is that a case having the same subject matter has not been filed before another regional human rights court. 142 It would thus appear that the Statute does not provide for the ACtHR's exclusive jurisdiction and that submitting complaints with the UN treaty bodies would not be disallowed. If this conclusion is correct, it should be possible to file, even simultaneously, complaints before the ACtHR and the UN Human Rights Committee or the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women or even the African Commission, 143 but curiously not, say, the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (ACtHPR). It is not readily apparent why recourse to the ACtHPR would be impermissible but not to the African Commission, except perhaps in relation to the nature of the final decision, whether or not it is deemed legally binding. Naturally, there is no guarantee that the other bodies will accept them. 144 If this was not the intention it might otherwise have been preferable to have used the language of the ACHR or the ECHR which exclude other international settlement procedure. 145 The third condition is that the case must be lodged with the ACtHR at the latest six months after the applicant was notified of the final judgment given by the domestic court. The six-month rule might be in line with the European and InterAmerican systems 146 but is arguably too short for a region with no prior experience of human rights litigation and should therefore be interpreted flexibly. It would nevertheless have been preferable to have adopted the rule applied by the African system that the case must be submitted within a reasonable period of time. 147 The ACtHR would additionally need to ensure that the complaint impleads a state party, 148 or that the state accepts the ACtHR's jurisdiction ad hoc under article 20 of the Statute, 149 and that it possesses jurisdiction ratione materiae. The substantive provisions of the 2004 Charter therefore assume added importance.
Under article 22 of the Statute, 150 the ACtHR is entitled at any stage of the proceedings to assist the litigant parties to reach an amicable settlement "on the basis of human rights principles and values and the rules of justice".
151 This procedure will be confidential. However, should a settlement be reached, the ACtHR shall render a decision, which will not only record briefly the facts but also the solution reached. The case will then be struck off the docket. The Assembly is responsible for monitoring the execution of the decision.
to be seen how litigant parties will use the capacity under article 27 of the Statute 162 to have judgments effectively reviewed and how the ACtHR itself will tackle this matter, arguably these are provisions which are not in line with regional human rights standards which limit revision to the emergence of new facts or evidence. 163 The Statute is silent on the correction of errors but this may be addressed by the Rules. 164 The question of the enforcement of judgments, always an issue of concern as regards to the effectiveness of human rights courts, is addressed in article 26 of the Statute. 165 In particular, judgments shall be enforced immediately after being served to litigant parties and in accordance with the domestic procedures concerning the execution of final judgments given by national courts. 166 To ensure execution as envisaged in article 26 of the Statute 167 contracting parties will have to introduce the necessary changes in their domestic legal orders. As matters now stand, it is not clear from the Statute whether supervision of the judgments' execution will rest with the ACtHR itself or the Assembly. Under article 29 of the Statute 168 instances of noncompliance with the judgments have to be included in the ACtHR's annual report which will be presented to the Assembly for its approval. 169 What actions the Assembly may take to ensure compliance and secure the execution of judgments is not set out in the Statute since the adoption of a mechanism to ensure this awaits the work of the Assembly. It is submitted that the Assembly should be able to refer the matter of a contracting party's persistent refusal to comply to the LAS Council for further action, although it is true to say that there is no institutional link between the two organs. As far as the ECtHR is concerned, the situation is considerably different because its judgments are transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, the decisionmaking body of the Council of Europe, which is then responsible for supervising their execution. 170 Although it is evident from the language of article 26 of the Statute 171 that judgments are binding on the parties to a case, it might have been prudent to have added an explicit provision to that effect in the Statute.
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There are a number of disturbing omissions in the Statute. Foremost is the absence of authority for the ACtHR to indicate or order, either proprio motu or at the request of a party to the case, provisional, or interim, measures in cases of extreme seriousness and urgency which are necessary to avert irreparable damage to individuals, or to preserve the rights of the parties. 173 No provision is made should a party fail to appear before the ACtHR or does not defend the case against it. 174 Neither is any provision made for any contracting party or the LAS Council or any subordinate organization and agency that believes it has a legal interest in a case or could be affected by its decision to petition the ACtHR to intervene. 175 In addition, other procedural matters, relating to written and oral procedures, are not covered. 176 There is no mention of evidence and witnesses. 177 It may be that the Rules will address these issues.
F. Advisory Opinions
According to article 21 of the Statute, 178 the ACtHR is endowed with the capacity to issue advisory opinions but the applicants with standing to request an opinion are limited. 179 In particular, contracting parties are not permitted to seek advisory opinions, this right being available only to the LAS Council or to any organizations and agencies subordinate to the LAS and only in regards to legal issues relating to the 2004 Charter and other Arab conventions on human rights. It is submitted that the Committee as well as the Permanent Commission qualify as such subordinate bodies. Provided they possess the necessary political will to act proactively, this avenue could be exploited astutely to promote and consolidate human rights in the region. Separate opinions are allowed and, just like majority opinions, they must be reasoned.
G. Final Matters of Procedure
The procedure for the amendment of the Statute is laid down in its article 34. 180 The initiative could come either from the ACtHR itself or from any contracting party, and will be addressed to the Assembly. Amendments shall enter into force one month after being ratified by two-thirds of contracting parties. A problematic aspect is that the amendments will not come into force for all parties but only for those which have accepted them. It follows that until all parties have ratified them the ACtHR will be forced to apply both the revised and the original Statute depending on whether the applicant and/or the respondent state has or has not accepted the amendments. Peculiar as this might be, it is in line with the workings of the LAS where decisions reached by a majority (i.e. not by unanimous vote) are binding only upon those Member States which have accepted them.
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The Statute shall become operative one year after its entry into force.
182
Withdrawal from the Statute is envisaged in its article 35 and will be effective one year after written notice is given to the LAS Secretary-General. 183 Cases before the ACtHR which were pending before the withdrawal came into effect shall continue and the withdrawing state "shall not be exempted […]from its obligations arising from the Statute while it was a party to it".
184 An interesting question is whether withdrawal from the LAS would lead to withdrawal from the ACtHR as well. This is the case under article 58(3) of the ECHR, stipulating that those contracting parties ceasing to be members of the Council of Europe shall cease to be parties to the ECHR under the same conditions. 185 However, it should be noted that the relationship between the ECHR and the Council of Europe is much more integrated compared to that between the 2004 Charter and LAS, while the Council of Europe's Member States are required to ratify the ECHR.
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*** is only so much that the Rules can be expected to do and realistically they cannot create a right of individual petition where none exists in the parent instrument. 189 Given its present mandate it is certain that the ACtHR is unlikely to be burdened with work. The ACtHR's membership will be crucial; an activist and courageous bench, drawing on a court's inherent powers or a creative, teleological approach to interpretation, could enhance its protective mandate. But it would have been unrealistic to have expected more from many of the regimes in question. Of course, it is theoretically possible for the LAS to expand the ACtHR's mandate in a future protocol.
Thus far the record of ratifications of the Statute is disappointing. Saudi Arabia became the first state to approve it on June 24th 2016. 190 Six more Member States must adopt it before the ACtHR can become operative. A NGO has called on LAS Member States not to ratify the Statute until and unless it undergoes thorough revision, e.g. giving individuals direct access to the ACtHR. 191 However, the prospect of a repetition of what happened with the Arab Charter of Human Rights of 1994 is not especially appealing, especially if this meant that the region would have to wait many years before the ACtHR were finally set up. To what degree suasion from outside the region could be a factor in strengthening the protective mechanism is difficult to judge when dealing with illiberal regimes. The fact that European governments are, with the adoption of Protocol No 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 192 seeking to rein in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), calls into question their moral standing, weakens their ability to lead by example and project soft power, and undermines diplomatic efforts to inculcate good practice in other regional bodies. However, it would not be proper to consider the LAS in isolation. While the LAS has the distinction of being one of the oldest regional organizations it is by no means the only such association in that part of the world and many of its Member States are also members of other important regional groupings, such as the African Union 193 and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). 194 Undoubtedly, the African Union has developed a relatively complex human rights system that is reasonably capable of holding Member States to account. 195 Nor should it be overlooked that many of the LAS Member States are already bound to defend and promote human rights as contracting parties to United Nations treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 196 and the Convention against Torture. 197 The 2004 Charter and the Statute, as regional complements to the protection and promotion of fundamental rights and freedoms, do not therefore constitute the only options. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the states in question tend to accept only minimal oversight.
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Insofar as the Statute itself is concerned, its limited locus standi specifications arguably render it fundamentally flawed and unfit for purpose. It is unlikely to be able satisfy the clamour for justice in the region and as such could even act to undermine the faith and the trust of the people in international institutions. majority population. See Sands & Klein, supra note 1 at 148-149. In 1990 the OIC undertook to safeguard human rights through the Cairo Declaration. The revised OIC Charter contains a binding commitment to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, art 1(14). Provision is made for a human rights body, the Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission, OIC Charter at art 5(6). Its Statute was adopted in 2011 and it is essentially a consultative, advisory and promotional body, with no powers of enforcement, see 2011, 50 ILM 1152.
